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Article 3

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PERSONS &
THINGS: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
J.-R. Trahan *
Of all the juridical distinctions, the most important opposes
persons and goods. More than a distinction, it is a
hierarchy: the person is the grandest of riches, for he has
an infinite value. The riches of the world are given to man
so that he may be the master of them; sometimes, they
become the master of him.
Philippe Malaurie & Laurent Aynès

1

If the summa divisio of the civil law–the distinction between
“persons” and “things”–can be traced back through the pages of
history to a single source, then that source may well be the
following line of the Institutes of the second century Roman
jurisconsult Gaius: 2 “Now, all the law that we make use of pertains
either to persons or to things or to actions.” 3 This is not to say that
the concepts “person” and “thing” were unknown to Gaius’
predecessors and contemporaries; they were not. But Gaius seems
to have been the first to have set these concepts in an apparent
binary opposition to each other and almost certainly was the first to
have attached great significance to that opposition, 4 making of it
*

James Carville Alumni Professor of Law. I wish to thank Agustín Parise,
Research Associate at the Center of Civil Law Studies, for his invaluable
contributions to the research on which this preface is based.
1. PHILIPPE MALAURIE & LAURENT AYNES, DROIT CIVIL: LES BIENS (2d ed.
2005) (J.-R. Trahan trans., 2008).
2. On Gaius and his INSTITUTES, see generally PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW
IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 19-20 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999); and BARRY
NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 34-36 (1984).
3. GAI. INST. bk. I, tit. II, no 8 (J.-R. Trahan trans., 2006).
4. 1 FREDERICK CARL VON SAVIGNY, TRAITÉ DE DROIT ROMAIN § LIX,
389-90 (Charles Guenoux trans., Firmin Didot Frères 1840) (“[I]t has often been
claimed, or at least tacitly acknowledged, that among the Romans there had been
had a very ancient custom of relating the rules of law to three classes of objects:
persona, res, actio, and that the Roman jurisconsults had all, or nearly all,
followed these division in their treatises . . . Now, not a single historical fact
serves to support it [this claim], and diverse circumstances seem to contradict it.
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part of the very organizational backbone of his Institutes. 5
Though Gaius considered “persons” and “things” to be
fundamentally different from each other, it is less than entirely
clear of what he considered this difference to consist. Absent from
his Institutes–the only writing of his that has survived–is any
definition of either term, any explanation of the supposedly
distinctive “nature” or “essence” of one or the other, on the one
hand, or “things,” on the other, or any account of the criterion(a)
that must de used in determining whether a given “something” is
one or the other. The basis for the distinction, like the distinction
itself, Gaius appears to have taken to be so “self-evident” as to
require no explanation.
Despite Gaius’ silence regarding the basis for the distinction, it
may be possible to get some idea of his understanding of it by
looking at the various “somethings” that Gaius and, in addition, his
predecessors and contemporaries treated under the rubrics
“person” and “thing,” respectively. Many Romanists have, in fact,
attempted to do precisely that. 6 And they have arrived at
something of a consensus. Let us consider, first, the concept
“person.” The Roman jurisconsults seem to have taken the
concept to include, first and most fundamentally, a “human being”
or, better yet, every human being properly so called, 7 even
including “slaves.” 8 To this extent, the term “person” was given

. . . Thus, we have no reasons to regard the division of Gaius as generally
accepted; rather, we must regard it as a particular idea of this jurisconsult . . . .”)
5. Gaius’ Institutes are divided into three parts, called “books,” which bear
the captions of “persons,” “things,” and “actions,” respectively.
6. See, e.g., 1 SAVIGNY, supra note 4, § LIX, at 391-401; 1 JOHN AUSTIN,
LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW) lect. XII,
at 348-55, & lect. XIII, at 337 & 360-64 (Robert Campbell ed., 5th ed. 1885);
NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 60-61 & 98-99 (8th ed. 1982).
7. 1 AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XII, at 346, 350, 352; NICHOLAS, supra note
2, at 60-61.
8. 1 AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XII, at 348-49; NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at
60-61.
The temporal span of this “human being” stretched from the moment of
“live birth” (or, for certain limited purposes, such as successions, from the
moment of conception) until the moment of natural death. JUST. DIG. bk. 1, tit.5,
no 7 & bk. 50,tit. 16, no 231 “Live birth” required, among other things, that the
child be born with “human form” (as opposed to that of a “monster”). TWELVE
TABLES tab. IV, law III.
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its common sense. But for the Roman jurisconsults the concept did
not stop there. To the contrary, it was also extended, at least for
some purposes, to certain groups or collectivities of human beings
(e.g. the collegia) 9 and, in at least one case, to an aggregate of
rights and duties, namely, those of an hereditary estate (haereitas
jacens). 10 As applied to such “somethings,” the term “person” was
used in an analogical or fictitious sense.11 Next, let us consider the
concept of “thing.” For the Roman jurisconsults, this concept
encompassed, first and foremost, physical objects external to the
human body that can be detected by means of the senses (res
corporales). 12 The term “thing,” to this extent, had its common
sense. But the Roman jurisconsults went further, extending the
concept to cover (1) what we moderns would call “rights” and
“duties” (so called res incorporales) 13 and (2) even, in one
instance and for limited purposes, a certain class of “person,”
namely, the slave to the extent that he (or should one now say
“it”?) might constitute the object of a revindicatory action brought
by his master. 14 Evaluated according to the standards of modern
legal science, this schema, obviously enough, leaves much to be
desired. 15
9. 1 AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XII, at 354.
10. Id. at lect. XII, at 354 & 355.
11. There is yet another wrinkle in the fabric of the Romans’ understanding
of “person” that complicates any attempt at explicating that understanding. This
wrinkle is the Romans’ failure to differentiate sharply between–indeed, even to
confuse–“personality,” on the one hand, and “status,” on the other. See, e.g.,
G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT no 40, at 39 (T.M. Knox trans., 1962); 1
AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XII, at 352-53, & lect. XIII, at 363-64; NICHOLAS,
supra note 2, at 61; see also 1 SAVIGNY, supra note 4, § LIX, at 391-95; see
generally Jeanne Louise Carriere, From Status to Persons in Book I, Title 1 of
the Civil Code, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1268-69 (1999).
12. 1 AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XIII, at 360.
13. Id. at lect. XIII, at 360 & 361.
14. Id. at lect. XIII, at 361 & 362-63.
15. HEGEL, supra note 11, no 40, at 39 (decrying the “perversity and lack of
speculative thought” in the schema); NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 60-61
(characterizing the schema as “rough and ready” and as lacking a “coherent
theory”); see also 1 AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XIII, at 361 (complaining that
the inclusion of “incorporeals” in the category of things creates “perplexing
ambiguity”) & 2 AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XLVI, at 777 (denouncing the
Roman distinction between corporeal and incorporeal things as “utterly
useless”); 2 Charles Aubry & Charles Rau, Droit Civil Français § 162 (Paul
Esmein rev., 7th ed. 1961), in 2 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 6 (La. St. L. Inst.
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For over a millennium after Gaius, the development of a more
scientific understanding of the distinction between persons and
things remained elusive. In his Institutes, Justinian simply
reproduced Gaius’ statement of the distinction 16 word for word and
without change. So things remained when, several centuries later,
first the Glossators 17 and then the Commentators 18 set to work
explicating the then recently “rediscovered” works of Justinian.
For example, Bracton’s Of the Legislation and the Customs of the
English, a work apparently influenced by the Glossator Azo of
Bologna, 19 we find yet another reproduction, without further
elaboration, of Gaius’original statement on persons, things, and
actions. 20 Then there are the Las Siete Partidas, a 13th century
Spanish law compilation that drew on the works of the Glossators
and early Commentators. 21
Though this work speaks of
“persons”and of “things,” it never defines either term and–this is
what is really surprising–it never sets the two over in opposition to
each other.
Not until the emergence of the new school of “natural law”
theory in the 16th century, of whom the earliest representative is
the Dutch Romanist Hugo Grotius, did anyone do much to improve
on the old Roman schema. Regarding “persons,” Grotius added
little to the stock of existing ideas, but what little he did add proved
to be important: “persons,” he wrote, are those who “have rights to
things.” 22 Though Grotius himself did not say as much, this
attribute of persons clearly implies–indeed, presupposes–another,
namely, that persons “can” have such rights, in other words, have
the “capacity” to receive of acquire them. (Re-) conceptualizing

trans. 1966) (characterizing the Roman distinction between corporeals and
incorporeal things as “arbitrary”).
16. JUST. INST. bk. I, tit. III (J.-R. Trahan trans., 2006).
17. On the Glossators, see generally STEIN, supra note 2, at 45-49;
NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 46-47.
18. On the Commentators, see generally STEIN, supra note 2, at 71-74;
NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 46-47.
19. See FREDERIC MAITLAND, BRACTON AND AZO (1895); CARL
GUTERBOCK, BRACTON (Brinton Coxe trans., 1866); STEIN, supra note 2, at 64.
20. See HENRICI DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSEUTUDINIBUS ANGLIÆ
bk. I, ch. VI, at 29 (Travers Twiss ed., 1878).
21 . See STEIN, supra note 2, at 65-66.
22. 1 HUGO GROTIUS, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF HOLLAND bk. I, ch. II, no 28,
at 15 (R.W. Lee trans., 1926).
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“persons” in this way, Grotius effectively made it possible to
uncouple “personality” from “humanity,” a development that was
to have lasting significance. So (re-) understood, the category of
person could easily embrace collectivities of human beings, though
Grotius himself seems not to drawn this inference. Regarding
“things,” Grotius broke new ground by providing a definition:
“that which is external to man and in any way useful to man.” 23
For Grotius, “man” evidently meant “mind” or “spirit,” for Grotius
included among that which is “external to man” not only natural
objects (such as trees) and man-made objects (such as houses), but
also the human body, human life itself (understood as physical
existence), and even certain attributes of human life, such as
“honor” and “reputation.” 24 Perhaps recognizing the potentially
dangerous implications of this reification of the body, life, honor,
and reputation, and the like, Grotius introduced a new
subcategorization of things, the point of which seems to have been
to foreclose those very implications. According to Grotius, things
can be subdivided into “alienable” and “inalienable,” and things
such as the body, life, honor, and reputation fall into the latter
subcategory. 25
To find still further innovations in thinking about the
distinction between persons and things, one must “fast forward”
the tape of history to the early 19th century. 26 At that time a
23. Id. at bk. II, ch. I, no 3, at 65.
24. This definition of “thing” anticipates that of Hegel two hundred years
later. See HEGEL, supra note 11, no 42, at 40 (“What is immediately different
from free mind is that which, both for mind and in itself, is the external pure and
simple, a thing, something not free, not personal, without rights . . . [W]hen
‘thing’ is contrasted with ‘person’ . . . it means the opposite of what is
substantive, i.e. that whose determinate character lies in its pure externality.
From the point of view of free mind . . . the external is external absolutely,
and it is for this reason that the determinate character assigned to nature by the
concept is inherent externality.”).
25. In drawing this new distinction, Grotius at the very least anticipated, if
he did not in fact lay the groundwork for, the development years later of the
distinction between “patrimonial” and “extra-patrimonial” rights. On this
distinction, see generally FRANÇOIS TERRÉ & PHILIPPE SIMLER, DROIT CIVIL:
LES BIENS no18, at24-25, & nos 23-26, at 29-32 (7th ed. 2006); JEAN
CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL: INTRODUCTION no 166, at 321; Aubry & Rau, supra
note 15, § 162, at 5-6.
26. One familiar with the history of the civil law tradition will recognize
that, in passing from the 16th century to the 18th century, I have skipped over a
number of “big names” within that tradition, including Jean Domat and Robert
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number of scholars, most of them in Germany, 27 provided
something of a new “take” on “persons,” “things,” or both and, in
so doing, developed what many now call the “modern”
understanding of persons and things. 28
Regarding “persons,” the modern theory breaks new ground at
two points. First, the modern theory (re-) defines “person” as the
“subject of rights and duties,” in the sense of that which is
“capable” of being “subjected” to duties and/or of being “invested”
with rights. 29 The following passage from the work of the German
Romanist Anton Thibaut is fairly typical:

Pothier. This is not an oversight. Though both of these great civilists
recognized the distinction between persons and things, neither of them did much
to clarify either concept or to fix with greater precision the boundaries between
the two. Their theoretical interests clearly lay elsewhere.
27. Austin attributes this development to “modern civilians.” 1 AUSTIN,
supra note 6, lect. XII, at 348, 350, & 351. Given Austin’s background, the
scholars he had in mind were probably the early German Pandectists, such as
Hugo, Thibaut, Puchta, and Savigny.
28. See NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 60; see also 1 AUSTIN, supra note 6,
lect. XII, at 348, 350, & 351.
29. See ANTON THIBAUT, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
JURISPRUDENCE § 101, at 88 (Nathaniel Lindley trans., 1855); G.F. Puchta,
Outlines of Jurisprudence as the Science of Right § 28, in WILLIAM HASTIE,
OUTLINES OF THE SCIENCE OF JURISPRUDENCE 100 (1887); 2 SAVIGNY, supra
note 4, § LX, at 1; also 1 AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XII, at 348, 350-51, 352,
353 & lect. XIII, at 358. Austin considered the (re-) conceptualization of
“person” in terms of “subject of rights and duties” to be the result of an error. 1
AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XII, at 348, 350-54. Is it not possible, however, that
it is, on the contrary, the result of an attempt to “re-think” the traditional Roman
distinction between person and thing so as to put it on a sounder scientific
footing? See 1 SAVIGNY, supra note 4, § at 400 (“[N]o reason obliges us to
imitate servilely what are acknowledged defects, and we can, without being
presumptuous and without being prideful, try to put the historical materials of
the Roman law into operation in a rational manner and to present them under
another form than that adopted by Gaius.”).
This new notion of the “subject” of rights and duties formed one of the
conceptual cornerstones of the distinction, elaborated sometime later, between
the two senses of “law” or “right,” namely, “subjective” law or right (in French,
droit subjectif) and “objective” law or right (in French droit objectif). On this
distinction, see generally MALAURIE & AYNES, supra note 1, no 41, at 40;
CARBONNIER, supra note 25, no 104, at 191; no 105, at 193; & no 163, at 315
(26th ed. 1999); Aubry & Rau, supra note 15, § 162, at 1; HANS KELSEN, PURE
THEORY OF LAW 169-70 (Max Knight trans., 2d ed. 1978); JEAN DABIN, LE
DROIT SUBJECTIF (1952).
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We have next to consider the subjects of rights and duties,
that is to say, the persons to whom something is possible
or necessary. In the first place we must examine who or
what, either from its very nature or by the precepts of
positive law, can be considered as capable of rights and
duties. By Person is meant whatever in any respect is
regarded as the subject of a right: by Thing, on the other
hand, is denoted whatever is opposed to person. 30
This manner of (re-) defining person marks an important shift–
indeed, a reversal–in thinking about “personality.” Whereas in
earlier times “being a person” was thought to be logically prior to
and to be the cause of “having legal capacity,” hereafter “having
legal capacity” will be thought to be logically prior to and to be the
cause of “being a person.” 31 Second, the modern theory establishes
a new “umbrella” category into which the various non-natural
persons (collegia, corporations, etc.) can be conveniently placed,
namely, “moral” (in the sense of “psychological”) or “juridical”
person. 32 This passage from the work of the German Romanist
Savigny is representative:
[Up to this point] I have dealt with the capacity of law as
something that corresponds to the idea of the individual;
here, I will envision it as something that is extended
artificially to fictitious beings. One calls them “juridical
persons,” that is to say, persons who exist only for
juridical ends, and these persons appear to us alongside
the individual, as subjects of relations of law. 33
Attempts at specifiying the “true nature” of such “juridical
persons,” though often made, have usually ended in failure or, at
the very least, confusion. 34
30. THIBAUT, supra note 29, § 101, at 88.
31. See Carriere, supra note 11, at 1266-67 (1999) (“. . . Aubry and Rau in
the late nineteenth century, and Planiol and Ripert in the early twentieth,
regarded juridical capacity as definitional of personality, rather than as a
consequence of it: Persons are ‘[t]hose beings capable of having rights and
obligations.’ Nicholas characterizes this view as that of ‘the modern lawyer’.”).
32. See THIBAUT, supra note 29, § 113, at 93; 2 SAVIGNY, supra note 4, §
LX, at 1.
33. 2 SAVIGNY, supra note 4, § LXXXV, at 234.
34. See generally Puchta, supra note 29, § 28, at 101-02; 2 SAVIGNY, supra
note 4, § LXXXV, at 237-39; KELSEN, supra note 29, at 172; HANS KELSEN,
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Regarding “things,” the thinking of the modern theorists seems
to have headed off in two rather different, if not opposing,
directions. On the one hand, at least some theorists provided an
even more expansive definition of “thing” than did Grotius,
namely, “all that which is not a ‘subject’.” To this non-subject,
these theorists gave the new term “object.” As Thibaut put it, “By
thing (res) is meant whatever neither is nor can be the subject of a
legal relation, but yet may be the object of a legal transaction and
so mediately the object of a right . . .” 35 Other theorists, however,
provided a restrictive definition of “thing,” one that limited that
category to what the Romans called res corporales that is, natural
and man-made objects that exist in time and in space and that can
be sensed. 36 A good example of this restrictive definition is
provided by the German Romanist Puchta:
The jural relationships in which man stands as an
individual relate to the external goods which he needs for
his existence. These goods–the earth, with what it
produces and that man makes thereof–are primariy
destined for the supply of the wants which he has . . .
The principle of right does not deal with these external
goods in all their natural multiplicity, but it brings into
prominence their univeral character as destined for man
and his wants. This common characteristic is expressed by
the word “thing”. . . 37
The true point of restricting the category of “things” in this
way was to expel from that category a class of “somethings” that,
in the minds of these theorists, had never properly belonged there,
namely, so-called “incorporeal” things. For these theorists, that
class of “somethings,” scientifically understood, belonged in a
different category altogether, namely, that of “rights” or
“obligations.” 38 The effect of this reclassification, obviously

GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE 97-98 (Anders Wedberg trans.,
1945).
35. THIBAUT, supra note 29, § 146, at 116. This seems to be the definition
Nicholas has in mind when he states that, for a modern lawyer, “things” refers to
“rights and duties themselves.” NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 60.
36. Puchta, supra note 29, § 23, at 69-70.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., 1 AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XIII, at 361-62, & 2 AUSTIN,
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enough, is a re-“materialization” of the concept of “thing.”
During the 20th century a number of thinkers within the civil
law tradition took yet another look at one or another of the aspects
of the distinction between persons and things. Perhaps the most
famous of these thinkers was the German civilist and positivist
legal philosopher Kelsen. As was his wont, when he came to the
traditional concept of “person,” he set about attempting to
demythologize 39 it. Because his point of view is so distinctive and
because it became so influential, at least in some quarters, his
remarks merit being reproduced at length:
The concept of the legal person–who, by definition, is the
subject of legal duties and legal rights–answers the need
of imagining a bearer of rights and duties. Juristic thinking
is not satisfied with the insight that a certain human action
or omission forms the contents of a duty or a right. There
must exist something that “has” the duty or the right. In
this idea a general trend of human thought is manifested.
Empirically observable qualities, too, are interpreted as
qualities of an object or a substance, and grammatically
they are represented as predicates of a subject. This
substance is not an additional entity. The grammatical
subject denoting it is only a symbol of the fact that the
qualities form a unity. . . 40
. . . What, now, does the statement of traditional theory
mean that the legal order invests the human being, or a
group of human beings, with the quality of legal
personality–with the qualify of being a “person”? It
means that the legal order imposes obligations upon, or
confers rights to, human beings, that is, that the legal
order makes human behavior to content of obligations and
rights. “To be a person” or “to have a legal personality” is
identical with having legal obligations and subjective

supra note 6, lect. XLVI, at 777; see generally NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 9899. The German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) reflects this sharp
distinction between “things,” on the one hand, and “rights,” on the other,
together with this restrictive definition of the former. See BGB § 90 (“Only
corporeal objects are things as defined by law”).
39. See KELSEN, supra note 34, at 93.
40. Id.
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rights. The person as a holder of obligations and rights is
not something that is different from the obligations and
rights, as whose holder the person is presented–just as a
tree which is said to have a trunk, branches, and blossoms,
is not a substance different from trunk, branches, and
blossoms, but merely the totality of these elements. The
physical or juristic person who “has” obligations and
rights as their holder, is these obligations and rights–a
complex of legal obligations and rights whose totality is
expressed figuratively in the concept of “person.”
“Person” is merely the personification of this totality. 41
. . . The statement that a person has duties and rights . . .
is meaningless or an empty tautology. It means that a set
of duties and rights, the unity of which is personified,
“has” duties and rights. . . . But it is nonsense to say that
law imposes duties and rights upon persons such a
statements means that law imposes duties upon duties and
confers rights upon rights . . . 42
So (re-) conceived, the “person” dematerializes completely; he
ceases to be even the disembodied “mind” of Grotius. The person
is not something that, existing somehow apart from legal rules,
constitutes rights and duties on the basis of those rules; rather, he is
created by those rules and is constituted by those rights and duties!
In this way the person becomes a mere “ghost in the machine” of
the legal order. 43
Influential though it may have been, Kelsen’s
reconceptualization of legal personhood failed to gain the
allegiance of everyone. Take, for example, the Belgian civilist and
natural law philosopher Jean Dabin. In his view, talk of a subject
of rights presupposes some “being” that exists prior to its
becoming a subject of rights. 44 The argument runs as follows:
But if subjective right is, in fact, in a certain manner a
41. KELSEN, supra note 29, at 172-73.
42. KELSEN, supra note 34, at 95.
43. Law brings us back to the etymological meaning. The Latin word
persona first meant “theatrical mask.” The word was borrowed to the Etruscan
phersu, designating a mask, before moving to the Greek and the Latin:
DICTIONNAIRE HISTORIQUE DE LA LANGUE FRANÇAISE (Alain Rey ed., Robert,
2006), v. Personne.
44. DABIN, supra note 29, at 107.
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relation, insofar as it is opposable to another . . . every
relation presupposes, by definition, that there be beings in
relation. Now, one of the beings in relation is precisely
the legal subject, the others being the persons who are
obliged to respect the right of the subject . . . 45
This is not to say that Dabin advocates a return to some earlier
conception of “person,” such as that of the German Pandectists or
Grotius. He does not. In fact, Dabin raises the question whether it
might not be better to dispense with the notion of “person”
altogether, retaining, in its stead, that of “subject.” 46 According to
Dabin, the concepts “person” and “subject” are not, as has so often
been assumed, equivalent. In contrast to the relatively more
malleable and contentless concept of “subject,” that of “person,”
he contends,
is introduced into scientific and philosophical language in
order to signify a notion that, though it no doubt is related
to the notion of legal subjects, nevertheless is different:
that of a being endowed with a reasonable nature and, as
such, having an end (purpose) of its own . . . 47
As Dabin sees it, this concept, though apt for describing human
beings, fails as a description of collectivities of human beings. 48
“Human beings is a reasonable ‘substance,’ but groups are only
‘accidents:’ is not reasonable substance a necessary condition for
personality?” he asks rhetorically. 49 The answer, of course, is
“yes.”
Between the time of Kelsen and Dabin and the present time,
the distinction between persons and things seems to have fallen off
the research agendas of most civilian legal scholars.50 But that
may soon be changing. The impetus for this change comes not
from within but from without the academy, specifically, from the
45. Id.
46. Id. at 107-09.
47. Id. at 108.
48. Id. at 108-09.
49. Id. at 109.
50. There is one notable exception. Between the end of the 1970s and the
end of the 1980s, Michel Villey and the others associated with the “Archives of
the Philosophy of Law,” published two sets of essays on the distinction: Les
biens et les choses, 24 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT (1979), and Le sujet
de droit, 34 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT (1989).

20

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 1

society at large. Thanks to recent social and technological
changes, our society now faces a number of new social problems,
problems as to which the distinction between persons and things is
highly pertinent. One such problem is the characterization of the
human fetus. As long as abortion was criminalized, the ancient
question of whether a fetus was merely a part of the mother’s body
(and, therefore, a “thing”) or an independent human being (and,
therefore, a “person”) was no great practical significance. But
when, thanks to the women’s rights movement and the so-called
“sexual revolution,” restrictions on abortion began to fall, this
question came to the forefront of public attention. Another such
problem is the characterization of animals. The rise of the
environmental movement has precipitated a reexamination, on the
philosophical plane, of the place of human beings within the larger
natural world. The traditional view–that the natural order was
created for man and that he, as master of it, is free to do with it
more or less as he pleases–has been increasingly challenged. As a
result, proposals made, but rejected, in times past to establish for
animals some kind of status intermediate between that of “things”
and “persons” are once again attracting attention. Finally, there is
the problem–perhaps one should say problems–that have arisen as
a result of the development of new artificial reproductive
technologies. Faced with the novel and, in some cases, utterly
fantastic products of these technologies–not only “supernumerary
embryos,” but also “clones” and “chimeras”–, our society grapples
with what to make of them (are they persons or things?) and what
to do with them (should they be given rights and, if so, what
rights?). If the law is to respond to these problems, it will require,
among other things, an adequate theory of the distinction between
persons and things. Revisiting that distinction, then, could not be
more timely.

